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The effect of family control on value and risk-taking in Mexico: A socioemotional 
wealth approach 
Abstract 
We construct an analytical framework to incorporate agency and stewardship 
perspectives, and the concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW), to analyse the effect of 
family participation on firm value and corporate risk-taking in Mexico. We find family 
firms enjoy higher value and tolerate higher levels of risk than non-family concerns. This 
differential becomes more important in more highly valued firms and more risk tolerant 
firms. Whereas the differential is also positively associated with the cash ownership of 
controlling families, the observed value/ risk effects entrench at higher levels of family 
ownership (i.e. above 40%-50%). We test whether the risk-taking preference of family 
firms is a mixture of two types of risk, performance hazard risk, which captures the familial 
desire to preserve SEW; and venturing risk, which firms take in expectation of improving 
future performance. Family firms seem to take more performance hazard risk 
independently of their cash flow ownership, which suggests that family firms perceive 
patrimony as a means of safeguarding resources for heirs, which raises tolerance to 
performance hazard risk. Firm value increases when firms follow good corporate 
governance practices.  
  
 





We investigate the performance, measured by corporate value and risk-taking, of 
family firms in Mexico within an agency-theoretic framework, which implicitly accounts 
for the intricacies of familial relationships. We motivate our study on a new perspective to 
explain the financial behaviour of family businesses based on non-financial reasons, which 
carries the label of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Gómez-Mejía et al (2007) initially 
developed the concept of SEW, with Berrone et al (2012) suggesting SEW is worthy of 
further research. The Mexican setting is relevant since Mexico is the country with the 
highest proportion of family firms (La Porta et al, 1999). Although the family ownership 
model dominates in Mexico, and generally across Latin America, empirical research on 
family firm performance for the region is scant albeit demonstrative of the complexities of 
family businesses (Brenes et al, 2011; Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007; González et al, 
2012; Machuga and Teitel, 2009).1  
We motivate our study on the decision by Mexico’s Stock Exchange to introduce - in 
1999 with subsequent amendments - a Mexican Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG). 
For firms in countries like Mexico, enacting codes of best practice effectively substitute for 
observed institutional frailties, especially if the codes comply with international standards 
(La Porta et al, 1998; Poletti-Hughes, 2009). Compliance offers family firms a vehicle for 
resolving intra-familial conflicts (Holan and Sanz, 2006). The marked differences in 
institutional and environmental factors between an emerging nation like Mexico and 
western economies imply the established norms, obtained from studies of western firms, 
may not apply to Mexican firms, which infers that country-based studies like ours are an 
                                                 
1 González et al (2012) suggest their findings on family firm performance in Colombia generalize to other 
Latin American countries including Mexico because of cross-country similarities in corporate governance and 
financial development. Brenes et al (2011) survey family members at 22 family firms in Latin America and 
consider the impact of governance structures on firm performance. On Mexican firms, Chong and Lopez-de-
Silanes (2007), and Machuga and Teitel (2009) find lower capital costs encourage firms to improve 
governance practices; and earnings quality is lower if family ownership is concentrated.  
  
appropriate conduit for knowledge development (La Porta et al, 1998, 2002; Kim and Gao, 
2013).  
We initiate our analytical framework from a broad perspective that performance 
differentials between family and non-family firms are indicative of the different principal-
agent problems facing each cohort (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In explaining why family 
firms outperform their non-family counterparts, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury 
(2006) posit that family firms in western economies are more effective in controlling 
agency costs because family members serve as principal and agent. A more intricate 
explanation, utilising a stewardship perspective, suggests that the comparative advantage of 
family firms is due to collective behaviour and the subordination of personal interests to 
family objectives (Eddleston and Kellermans, 2007). However, family firms could face 
intra-familial conflict, which creates antagonism amongst family members and leads to 
underperformance (Dyer, 2006). Irrespective of whether family members behave as agents 
or stewards, the family firm literature demonstrates that governance ultimately affects firm 
performance (Chrisman et al, 2007; Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007).  
We extend our analytical framework to incorporate developments in the family 
business literature as advocated by Berrone et al (2012). They make the case for the 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) approach to distinguish behavioural factors between family 
firms and non-family concerns. The concept of SEW or affective endowment contends that 
families, particularly in emerging countries, are emotionally connected to their firms or 
family entities (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007). How SEW affects firm performance is 
ambiguous. One perspective sees family firms as value maximisers because of the 
inextricable links between firm value and familial wealth, which motivate family owners to 
control agency costs (James, 1999). In contrast, family owners prioritise firm survival over 
value maximisation because of patrimony and a fear of endangering familial wealth 
  
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; González et al, 2012). In a SEW setting, families actively 
seek to retain familial ownership and control for subsequent generations though the desire 
to perpetuate can be driven also by non-financial criteria, such as, preservation of family 
authority, enjoyment of familial influence, inclusion of family members in key executive 
roles, continuation of family identity, among others (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007). The use of 
patrimony to secure resources for heirs is a long-established, cultural tradition in Mexico 
(Ruiz-Porras and Steinwascher, 2007).  
Our analytical framework utilises a two-stage empirical approach: first, we examine 
the performance (firm value) differential between family firms and non-family concerns; 
second, we test if risk-taking behaviour explains value differentials. Our rationale invokes 
the behavioural agency problem (Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía, 1998) that combines 
elements of agency theory and prospect theory of the firm. Under this schema, the risk 
preferences of family controllers (agents) are heterogeneous and vary by strategic choices. 
Agents formulate their choices under a “loss aversion” framework that encourages risk-
taking providing agents are more sensitive towards losing wealth than increasing it 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, 1991).  
The strategic choice process can yield either favourable or unfavourable outcomes for 
economic development. For instance, perpetuating the family entity (or SEW) could induce 
conservative strategic choices for risk-taking that belie value maximisation principles, 
which in turn may dampen firms’ future growth opportunities with implication for the 
wider economy. Similarly, family owners may behave in a risk-averse manner because they 
hold an undiversified portfolio (Morck and Yeung, 2003). Alternatively, strategically 
choosing to preserve SEW can incentivise family owners to increase their tolerance to risk. 
This view assumes the objective of family firms is long-term survival, which is expected to 
  
converge with economic growth and competitive advantage (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2011; 
Berrone et al., 2012).  
We employ two-way cluster regression analysis to measure the effect of family 
control and ownership on firm performance. Two-way clustering improves the precision of 
standard errors leading to better inferences than one-way cluster type methods (Petersen, 
2009; Thompson, 2011). Noting the potential for endogeneity problems to arise between 
performance and firms’ corporate governance structures, we treat certain ownership and 
control characteristics of firms as exogenous in the short-term for investigative purposes on 
grounds that these features are mostly time invariant (Adams et al, 2010). Finally, we use 
system generalized method of moments (system-GMM) to account for simultaneity, 
omitted variable bias, and dynamic endogeneity. 
We measure firm performance using indicators of corporate value and risk-taking. 
Our conjecture is that family firms in Mexico perceive family control as a means to 
enhance patrimony and safeguard SEW for heirs. To test this proposition, we draw on 
claims that the risk-taking preference of family firms is a mixture of two types of risk 
(Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007; 2011). Accordingly, we construct indicators of performance 
hazard risk and venturing risk. Performance hazard risk implies the probability of failure, 
threats to survival or below-target performance actions that firms take with the familial 
desire of preserving SEW. Venturing risk signifies the overall business risk that arises with 
the perusal of projects with uncertain returns but with an upside potential that firms take in 
expectation of improving future performance. Under the SEW perspective, family firms 
may be more likely to make business decisions that decrease performance variability even 
when the short-term outcome is a below-target performance (performance hazard risk). At 
par, the willingness to select high variance projects might be less, reducing the overall firm 
risk (venturing risk). If our conjecture holds, family firms should tolerate performance 
  
hazard risk if it preserves SEW and be averse to venturing risk (Berrone et al, 2012). A 
priori if our conjecture holds, we expect to find that performance hazard risk is the more 
dominant risk type for family firms in Mexico. To the best of our knowledge, this question 
remains unanswered in the extant literature. To expedite the analysis we carefully construct 
a dataset by means of hand collection for 101 listed Mexican firms between 2004 and 2013. 
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature in various important 
aspects. First, we develop our study based on a new theoretical formulation within the 
family business literature, advocated by Gómez-Mejía et al (2007) and Berrone et al (2012) 
which suggests that corporate financial behaviour might be the result of non-financial 
reasons (socioemotional wealth). To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study in the 
financial literature to apply the socioemotional wealth spectrum to explain performance 
differentials between family and non-family firms. Second, we demonstrate with a robust 
analysis that in effect, in a country like Mexico where “familial” behaviour2 predominates, 
the theory of socioemotional wealth is fit for explaining our hypotheses. Our findings are 
relevant beyond the Mexican setting to other countries with cultural similarities, especially 
in Latin America, where familial behaviour dominates. By examining this relationship, this 
study not only provides further insights into our understanding of family businesses but 
also extends the literature on corporate value and risk-taking. We contribute to literature on 
firms’ value and corporate risk-taking by empirically testing whether the objectives of 
family firms follow a financial aim (venturing risk) or a non-financial aim (performance 
hazard risk). 
In preview, we offer two main results. Firstly, family firms are more highly valued 
than non-family concerns in Mexico. Secondly, family firms willingly assume risk, and 
                                                 
2 The term familial behaviour highlights the differences in family and other social groups regarding the 
emotional, socio-cultural and legal relationships between the various members: spouses, parents, sibling, 
children and other relatives (Laungani, 2006). As discussed in Janjuha-Jivraj and Spence (2009), familial 
behaviour describes the emotional ties of a familial unit, which can be a factor for intergenerational 
reciprocity by the use of legal and financial structures. 
  
more specifically, performance hazard risk. The results support the SEW position that 
patrimonial objectives motivate the strategic choices of family firms, which conditions the 
behaviour of firms to assume additional performance hazard risk that in turn yields higher 
corporate value. Although our results are at odds with some previous findings of lower 
value and risk aversion at family firms (Morck et al, 2000; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006), we posit 
that the strategic choices of family businesses implicitly incorporate culture and tradition, 
which inform behavioural relationships and explain discrepancies in reported results. We 
suspect in countries like Mexico (and probably Latin America in general), the strength of 
family tradition increases the power of the SEW effect, and recommend that future research 
employs cross-country empirical analysis to consider this proposition.  
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis development. 
Section 3 presents the Data. Section 4 and 5 presents the Methodology and Results, 
respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development:  
2.1 Firm value and ownership in family firms  
The ways in which families own, control and manage their firms could produce 
performance differentials not only amongst family firms but also between family and non-
family concerns. The empirical record shows family firms outperform non-family in the US 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and west Europe (Maury, 2006). Agency theory and 
stewardship theory propose alternative explanations for this result. In an agency-theoretic 
framework, family controllers monitor firm managers, which reduces agency costs and 
ultimately improves performance (La Porta et al, 1998). A stewardship perspective posits 
that feelings of responsibility and burden sharing motivate family members. Such feelings 
can create a shared familial objective to fulfil organisational goals assuming that family 
members demonstrate altruistic behaviour. In this setting, altruism binds the interests of 
  
senior and junior family and fosters a participative strategic process, which lowers the 
propensity for intra-familial conflict leading to better firm performance (Eddleston and 
Kellermans, 2007).     
The empirical norms of western economies need not repeat in emerging nations like 
Mexico. Premised on agency theory, family firms can underperform if family controllers 
expropriate resources at the expense of the firm and other family members (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Stewardship theorists develop this point. They 
argue that expropriation changes the behaviour of family controller’s from collectivist to 
self-interest. This change breeds familial conflict and deleteriously affects firm 
performance. Other sources of conflict similarly affect performance, for instance, sibling 
rivalry, marital disharmony, and dispersed ownership rights across family members. Such 
behavioural traits produce negative emotions and antagonism that create inefficiencies, 
which family members compound if they become unwilling to monitor, evaluate and 
discipline one another. Ultimately, this process incentivises opportunism and shirking 
behaviour that could retard firm performance (Dyer, 2006).  
The role of patrimony requires special attention in performance evaluation. In 
Mexico, a strong cultural tradition perceives patrimony as a vehicle to secure resources for 
heirs (Ruiz-Porras and Steinwascher, 2007). The benefits of patrimony include the 
components of socioemotional wealth (SEW): preserving family authority, enjoying family 
influence and continuing familial identity (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007). Family controllers 
lengthen their tenure and control agency costs to maximise familial wealth. This feature of 
patrimony encourages longer investment horizons, which favourably influences investment 
efficiency and firm value (James, 1999; Machuga and Teitel, 2009). Longevity creates 
reputational and branding effects (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), and improves family 
relationships with external parties like banks with US family firms realising lower debt 
  
financing costs (Anderson et al, 2004). Moreover, the prospect of family firm managers 
engaging in opportunistic behaviour is lower when debt holders perform stringent 
supervision (González et al, 2012).  
Under our analytical framework, how family control impacts firm value is indicative 
of a country’s culture and traditions, the incentives and opportunities of controlling 
shareholders, and a country’s legal protection (La Porta et al., 1998). We contend that 
patrimony constitutes a comparative advantage for family firms whose greater investment 
efficiency delivers higher firm value compared to non-family firms:  
H1a. Firm value is greater in family firms than in non-family concerns in Mexico 
The size of cash flow stakes owned by controlling shareholders affects firm value. 
Large cash flow holdings are consistent with fewer agency conflicts and higher firm values 
(see Claessens et al, 2002 on Asia; Gompers et al, 2004 on the US). Although the benefits 
of holding larger cash flow rights increase relative to the loss from expropriation (Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005), the relationship between cash flow rights and firm value is non-linear: 
value diminishes when family control reaches 60% for US family firms (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003) and 51% in European countries (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). At lower 
levels of ownership, the positive alignment between cash flow rights and firm value could 
indicate that other (non-family) shareholders desire value maximisation and more 
effectively monitor firm activities. Nevertheless, the propensity for expropriation is 
increasing in cash flow rights, which suggests controlling shareholders could benefit from 
pursuing different objectives, including firm survival, technological innovation and growth 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
Higher levels of family control increase the propensity for entrenchment effects, 
which can reduce firm value if older members remain active albeit no longer effective in 
their roles (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Entrenchment restricts deployment of outside 
  
entrepreneurial talent in favour of low-quality family members in key managerial roles, 
which increases the prospect of expropriation (Buchanan and Yang, 2005; Perez-Gonzalez, 
2006). Entrenchment can prevent family firms from responding promptly to 
underperformance and changing leadership (Dyer, 2006). Therefore, our second hypothesis 
posits a relationship between family cash flow rights and firm value:  
H1b. An inverted U-shape characterises the relation between firm value and family 
cash flow rights. 
2.2 Risk-taking in family firms 
We rationalize that firm value derives from controlling owners’ preference for risk. If 
individuals exhibit risk aversion in decision making when expected returns are equivalent, 
one would expect risk tolerance to increase in direct proportion to expected returns. 
Therefore, risk preference explains differences in the level and variance of expected returns 
on investments (March and Shapira, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). However, the risk 
preferences of family controllers might incorporate other important familial objectives. 
Family ownership often promotes longer-term objectives, which raises involvement in 
entrepreneurial activities, for instance, expanding and renewing operations, and building on 
institutional capabilities (Rogoff and Heck, 2003; Zahra et al, 1999). In contrast, the 
prospect of losing the benefits of patrimony could induce conservatism at family firms 
(Naldi et al, 2007). Agency theory offers a different notion of family risk taking. Lins et al 
(2013) find that family-controlled firms underperform due to lowering investment to 
survive a financial crisis, which is to the detriment of outside shareholders.  Attig et al 
(2016) find through a study of dividend policy, that family firms reduce cash holdings and 
cut investment expenditures even at times of high profitability. This suggests that the 
intrinsic reason for this behaviour is not the preservation of corporate resources but the 
extraction of private benefits. Boubaker et al (2016) discuss that firms with a large 
  
controlling shareholder take less corporate risk because the dominant shareholder’s 
investment is commonly not diversified, which acts to incentivise the appropriation of 
existing wealth as opposed to the innovation to produce wealth. This effect is more 
compelling in family firms because normally holdings are less diversified. The empirical 
record on risk-taking by family firms is ambiguous due partly to incongruent definitions of 
risk (Huybrechts et al, 2013). We incorporate this result into our analytical framework and 
decompose risk into constituents to control for variation in risk-taking resulting from 
different family objectives.   
We conjecture that Mexico’s family firms perceive family control as a rational way 
of safeguarding resources for heirs. Following Gómez-Mejía et al (2007, 2011), we view 
the risk-preference of family firms as a mixture of two types of risk: performance hazard 
risk and venturing risk. Based on behavioural theory, performance hazard risk encapsulates 
the familial objective to preserve SEW although it increases the probability of below-target 
performance and bankruptcy. Under this premise, family controllers prefer to avoid a loss, 
especially when it refers to their socioemotional wealth. Therefore, family controllers are 
likely to accept threats to the firm's financial health (i.e., a greater probability of failure and 
below-target performance) to prevent that loss to SEW (e.g., acceptance of credit at high 
interest rates as an alternative of giving up equity to new investors). Gomez-Mejia et al 
(2007) explain that this behaviour may appear irrational because organizational failure 
implies the loss of all socioemotional wealth. Nevertheless, family firms may willingly 
assume performance hazard risk with the aim of preserving control of the family business, 
under the belief that they can manage the acquired risk eventually as it originates from 
inside the organization (Shapira, 1992). In contrast, family controllers assume venturing 
risks to improve firm performance when performance falls short of a desired level. Given 
these are forward-looking risks, firms face more variable and uncertain performance 
  
outcomes. A priori family firms willingly tolerate performance hazard risk if it preserves 
SEW but demonstrate aversion to venturing risk (Berrone et al, 2012).  
Therefore, our analytical framework does not presume that family controllers take 
additional risks in expectation of higher returns. Rather, risk-tolerance maybe indicative of 
the objective to prioritise firm survival over value maximisation. Although risk-aversion 
could indicate failure to implement profitable growth strategies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Morck et al, 2000; Campbell et al, 2001), family firms in the US manage the inherent risks 
of growth strategies by using more affiliate directors in an advisory capacity that does not 
reduce the role of family controllers (Jones et al, 2008). 
Drawing on the preceding arguments, our final hypothesis posits that family firms are 
more risk tolerant than non-family firms, because the strategic objective of family firms is 
to preserve SEW. Our analysis will shed light on which type of risk matters most for family 
firms in Mexico. 
H2a. Family firms in Mexico take more risk than non-family. 
H2b. Risk-taking in family firms reflects the strategic objective of protecting 
patrimony over value maximisation.  
3. Data 
Initially we sample all non-financial publicly listed firms on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange during 2006 (112 out of 134 firms). Non-availability of some reports reduces the 
sample to 101 firms in 2006. The final dataset contains 874 firm-year observations 
distributed as firms (year): 88 (2004); 98(2005); 101 (2006); 97 (2007); 90 (2008); 87 
(2009); 84 (2010); 79 (2011); 77 (2012); and 73 (2013). We obtain ownership and board 
structure information, and market and financial data from annual reports and DataStream, 
respectively. 
  
Investigating relationships involving family firms and their value and risk-taking 
requires suitable proxies for value and risk. To measure value, we use Tobin’s Q – (total 
assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) / total assets); for robustness we 
employ a second value indicator - the market-to-book ratio of equity.  
It is challenging to find proxy indicators of performance hazard risk and venturing 
risk because most risk indicators contain elements of each risk. Therefore, we follow 
Gómez-Mejía et al (2007) and proxy for performance hazard using the natural logarithm of 
salest-1-to-salest, this measure conceptualizes the possibility of negative outcomes, such as, 
the reduction of target achievements. Negative values indicate increasing performance 
(represented by sales), while positive ones are representative of decreasing performance. 
Hence, this variable increases as firm performance declines. Our indicator of venturing risk 
is termed firm risk. We specify the market model to estimate beta to proxy systematic risk, 
and calculate firm risk from the standard deviation of the residuals of the regression. 
Venturing risk represents the actions that firms follow when performance falls below 
target, which also increases the likelihood of unexpected outcomes, causing variance in 
performance. Such variance arises when firms pursue projects with uncertain returns, but 
with an upside potential, in search of improving firm performance. We define total risk as 
Pathan’s (2009) asset return risk indicator; the standard deviation of daily stock returns in 
year t (total risk) times the annual ratio of market value of equity-to-book value of total 
assets of year t times the square-root of 250 (number of trading days in a year). Total risk 
represents a composite of different types of risks that a firm takes and defines the general 
risk preferences of the corporation. 
To measure family control we identify the largest shareholder holding the majority of 
voting rights at a controlling threshold of 20% from annual reports. Our choice of threshold 
follows evidence that owners exert significant influence over firms at this level (Claessens 
  
et al, 2002; La Porta et al, 2002). A binary variable identifies family-owned firms and 
equals one if the ultimate controller in the control chain is an individual, zero otherwise. 
Therefore, an ultimate controller is the shareholder owning the largest direct or indirect 
stake of voting rights. Ultimate control occurs when control rights exceed their cash flow 
rights through deviations from the one share–one vote rule, pyramiding and cross-holdings 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002). A family in ultimate control holds a minimum of 20% of the 
controlling stake in the firm. Individuals are not in ultimate control at non-family concerns, 
which are held by the State, a voting trust (except when it is a family voting trust), or 
another corporation. We construct family corporate ownership [FCO] around the cash flow 
rights of a controlling family, and measure cash flow ownership over a scale of ten 
intervals each spanning ten percentage points: 1 represents the lowest (>0% to <10%) and 
10 the highest range (90% to 100%) of cash flow ownership. 
Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), a binary variable (CEM) signals use of 
control mechanisms. CEM equals one if an ultimate controller enhances control through 
any of the following mechanisms: (i) dual class shares: when shares carry limited voting 
rights for Mexican and foreign investors; (ii) pyramids: we deem control of Firm Y by 
pyramiding if the ultimate owner controls Y indirectly through another corporation that is 
not wholly controlled. Pyramiding implies a discrepancy exists between the largest 
shareholder’s control and ownership rights; (iii) multiple control chains: In Mexico, 
families consolidate their holding power through intra-familial agreements.  
We construct the BD Index to proxy the structure of the board of directors and 
control for inter-firm variation in corporate governance. BD increases by one unit if a firm 
complies with any of four good corporate governance practices recommended by the 
MCCG: (i) Board size - the number of board members (excluding deputies but including 
the chairperson). BD increases by one if board size ranges from five to fifteen members; 
  
(ii) Independence - the ratio of independent directors-to-board size. Independent directors 
should not hold links to a firm and in the case of family firms are not family members. BD 
increases by one if the ratio equals at least 20%; (iii) Board experience - the ratio of the 
number of public directorships held by board members-to-board size. BD increases by one 
if the experience indicator lies between one and three. Boards become busier when 
members hold three or more directorships (Ferris et al, 2003); and (iv) CEO-Chairperson 
duality. BD increases by one when firms separate the roles of CEO and chairperson.  
Our regressions specify firm-level controls. Leverage is the ratio of total debt-to-
market value of equity. The natural logarithm of total assets is proxy for size. In addition to 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers, agency theory identifies conflicts 
between equity holders and debt holders since debt contracts incentivise equity holders to 
invest in a sub-optimal manner. An asymmetric distribution of gains in favour of equity 
holders could encourage risk-taking even if investments prove to be value-decreasing 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991). Implicitly, increasing debt could signal a defensive strategy by 
equity holders because new debt issues lessens the probability that controllers will be voted 
out. It suggests the motivation of controllers is to secure private benefits. However, issuing 
debt could retard private benefits because the probability of bankruptcy is increasing in 
debt, ultimately erasing benefits, whilst debt covenants serve to constrain the control of 
owners (Harris and Raviv, 1988). Similarly, the free cash flow hypothesis posits that 
commitment to pay out future cash flows to debt holders constrains the accrual of benefits 
to equity holders (Jensen, 1986). We elect to allow the data to reveal the relationship 
between firm value and leverage for Mexican firms, but expect a positive relation between 
leverage and our measure of venturing risk assuming managers transfer resources from 
bondholders to shareholders (Leland, 1998).  
  
A priori size positively affects firm value and performance hazard risk if economies 
of scale create barriers to entry (Short and Keasey, 1999). Furthermore, larger firms enjoy 
wider access to internal and external funds. In terms of venturing risk, larger firms may 
demonstrate conservative behaviour when facing risky investment projects if the business 
is stable and returns are less volatile (John et al, 2008). To control for risks associated with 
higher leverage, we use the fixed assets ratio - the ratio of net total plant and equipment-to-
total assets. To control for growth opportunities, which imply more risk-taking (Nguyen, 
2011), we specify the dividends ratio - cash dividends paid-to-equity, which also is a 
vehicle to monitor management performance since firms that pay higher dividends and 
reveal greater detail on cash flow to the market may do so to minimise the risk of insider 
expropriation (González et al, 2013). However, firms beset with agency problems, say due 
to use of control enhancement mechanisms, might be pay a lower dividend (see Attig et al, 
2016, for discussion on family firms and dividend policy. In the regressions that follow, we 
assign unity to positive values of the dividend ratio and zero otherwise. We specify the 
number of years since incorporation in logarithms to measure firm age. Aging firms could 
lose their ability to compete, which causes performance to deteriorate as the firm decays. In 
contrast, age could help firms become more efficient because they find their comparative 
advantage and learn-from-doing. Similarly, mature firms might be increasingly averse to 
risk in comparison to younger firms, or older firms simply grow more adept to managing 
risk. Age also affects a firm’s corporate governance with older firms expected to develop 
superior governance practices. Lastly, we specify a binary variable, Crisis, which equals 
unity for the years 2008 and 2009, and zero otherwise to control for the effects of the 
global financial crisis.  
Panel A in Table 1 shows the number of firm-year observations by ultimate 
controller. Family-owned firms account for 76.2% of observations of which approximately 
  
47.9% refer to firms where family ownerships exceeds 50% of cash flow rights; 36.6% 
where rights lie between 20% and 50%; and 12.5% family voting trusts. Non-family 
ownership divides across widely held firms (15%) and others (8.8% including foreign-
owned, state-owned, voting trusts). We test for mean differences using Tukey’s adjustment 
for multiple comparisons. Firm value measured by Tobin’s Q is statistically comparable 
between family firms and widely held firms; within family firms, firms in which families 
control up to 20% of cash flow rights achieve a significantly larger Tobin’s Q ratio than 
firms where cash flow rights are greater. Other non-family firms underperform both family 
majority firms and widely held firms (at 5 percent).  Panel B shows the distribution of 
CEM. The number of observations for firms using at least one CEM is 62%: the most 
popular type of CEM is multiple control chains (44%) followed by pyramids (18%) and 
dual class shares (14%). Panel C shows the components of the BD Index. Whilst most 
firms follow the MCCG recommendations, compliance is highest for independent directors 
and board size (at 96% and 86%, respectively). After dividing compliance into four cohorts 
in ascending order of compliance, we find the most compliant firms enjoy higher value and 
exhibit a greater tendency to risk-taking.  
Table 1 here 
Panel A of Table 2 shows descriptive firm values and risks across industrial sectors, 
and reports the results of tests for mean differences between family firms and non-family. 
Whereas family firms assume significantly higher performance hazard and venturing risks 
(both 1 percent) and greater total risk (5 percent), they more frequently employ control 
mechanisms (1 percent) and operate smaller boards (1 percent). Family firms tend to be 
smaller, pay fewer dividends, are less reliant on raising funds via ADRs, and are younger 
(all at 1 percent). Although family firms comply more readily with the MCCG, the 
difference is insignificant.  
  
Table 2 here 
 
4. Methodology  
Regression analysis determines if performance differentials exist between family and 
non-family firms. We use two-way cluster regressions (firm and year) because they 
improve the precision of standard errors yielding better inference than one-way cluster type 
methods even with a limited number of clusters (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011). 
Improvements in precision obtain from adjusting the errors by weights that apply to the 
clusters to accommodate intra-group correlation by relaxing the normal requirement of 
independent observations. Equation [1] shows the abridged baseline model:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑗( 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 [1] 
 
Yit measures value or risk-taking; Family equals one for family-owned firms, zero 
otherwise. In the value regressions, board structure (BD) and control mechanisms (CEM) 
proxy for governance; size, leverage, dividends, fixed assets, and firm age plus its quadratic 
term are firm-level controls.  
Equation [2] replaces the binary indicator of family ownership with family corporate 
ownership (FCO), which measures the cash flow rights of family controllers, and a 
quadratic term to test for expected non-linear dynamics between cash flow rights and value:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑂𝑖
2 + 𝛽𝑘(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑗(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  [2] 
  
  
We control for industry effects using (unreported) binary variables (based on the 
Industry Classification Benchmark – see Table 2), and winsorize financial and market 
variables at the 99th and 1st percentile values to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
The choice of board structure (BD) and firm performance are endogenous. To 
address potential endogeneity concerns, Adams et al (2010) recommend treating some 
aspects of governance structure as exogenous in the short run for investigative purposes. 
We accept this suggestion because family control and ownership exhibit mild inter-
temporal variation. In addition, we account for endogeneity using formal methods. We take 
one period lags of firm-level variables to resolve simultaneity concerns;3 use restricted and 
unrestricted regressions (Klapper and Love, 2004) to test for omitted variable bias.  
Omitted variable bias arises when variables that determine board structure also affect 
performance. We tackle this problem as follows. First, we augment equation [1] with two 
variables that could affect BD and firm value. If the coefficient on BD retains significance, 
we can infer that omitted variables do not cause spurious results. The first additional binary 
variable equals unity if a firm’s headquarters locate in Mexico City and zero otherwise. A 
capital city location enhances value because economic development, infrastructure, and 
availability of services are greater in Mexico City (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007). A 
second variable equals one if a firm issued an ADR (American Depository Receipt) either 
on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and zero otherwise.4 A priori cross-listed 
firms comply with good governance practices at home and abroad which affects value. Ex 
ante these firms are more risky because the change in volatility of the underlying stock 
reflects changes in the return process arising from the foreign listing (Jayaraman et al, 
1993). Given that firm age might be endogenous to board structure, we estimate the models 
both with and without firm age.  
                                                 
3 Simultaneity is not problematic for corporate governance data. The limited annual variation in governance 
indicators implies that any changes are unlikely to cause changes in value. 
4 We obtain information from www.adr.com. 
  
Second, and noting the limitations of multiple regression models in the context of 
business research (Woodside, 2013), we test for omitted variable bias by augmenting the 
models with interaction terms between the corporate governance proxy, BD Index, and 
firm-specific controls. Identifying potential interactive effects rather than net effects is best 
practice in business research. As illustration, we evaluate the effect on value (risk) of a 
large firm complying with good governance practices. We orthogonalize the interaction 
terms used as predictor variables to circumvent multicollinearity problems.5 The effects of 
the interactions are determined by testing that the linear combination of coefficients on 
interaction terms equals zero; and by a Wald test procedure that the joint significance of the 
interactions equals zero. Our final estimations retain only significant interaction terms 
(Armstrong, 2012).  
Finally, the assumptions of exogeneity of the explanatory variables are relaxed and 
we re-estimate the regressions using formal methods to control for endogeneity problems. 
We use the General System Method of Moments (system-GMM), which uses a system of 
equations for each period in order to obtain estimates with standard errors robust to bias 
that might arise from endogeneity problems. System-GMM combines first difference 
equations with equations in levels that are instrumented with lags in levels and lags in 
differences of the endogenous variables, respectively (Wintoki et al, 2012). 
5. Results 
5.1 Estimated relationships from regressions on value 
Table 3 presents results from cluster regressions using Tobin’s Q (TQ) and the 
Market-to-Book ratio (MB) as proxies for firm value. Columns (1-2) show results from 
estimations of equation [1]. In unreported regressions, we re-estimate equation [1] 
specifying interaction terms between BD and other controls. Whereas we reject that the 
                                                 
5 To orthogonalize the interactive terms, we regress a standard interactive term on its constituents and employ 
the residual as a covariate.  
 
  
combined value of the coefficients is zero, closer examination of individual coefficients 
reveals we should retain the interaction term for fixed assets in the regressions with TQ and 
MB. Subsequently, we re-estimate equation [1] absenting the two covariates (Mexico City 
and ADR) used to control for omitted variable bias.6 BD retains significance when these 
variables are included, which demonstrates the results are not spurious.  
Our first result demonstrates that the corporate value of family firms is not 
significantly different from non-family concerns in Mexico when Tobin’s Q is proxy for 
firm value but family firms enjoy significantly higher value (at 5 percent) when the 
Market-to-book ratio is proxy. To test the robustness of the result, we re-estimate equation 
[1] using system-GMM to account for potential endogeneity of BD, size and leverage, 
which we instrument with their lags (see Table 7). GMM regressions specify the lagged 
value of the dependent variable to control for the dynamic nature of firm value (TQ or 
MB), which also are used as instruments. We consider that the dividends ratio is 
predetermined meaning we treat the remaining variables in the model as exogenous. A 
predetermined variable means that its current value is correlated with past values of the 
dependent variable. On the contrary, a variable is considered endogenous when its current 
value is correlated not only with the past values, but also with the current values of the 
dependent variable. Our model specifications are appropriate. First, it is desirable that the 
first differences are correlated in first order AR (1), indicating the presence of dynamic 
effects that are considered in the model through the inclusion of lags of the dependent 
variables. However, it is expected that these differences do not exist in AR (2), as if present 
they indicate that the estimators are inefficient and inconsistent. AR tests (1) and AR (2) p-
values produce the expected model support. Serial correlation is absent in the second 
                                                 
6 When TQ measures corporate value, the coefficients for BD from estimation of equations [1] and [2] absent 
controls for omitted variable bias (with firm age) are 0.1825 (0.1628) and 0.1703 (0.1539). Using the MB to 
check robustness, the comparative coefficients are 0.3720 (0.3263) and 0.3224 (0.3376). All coefficients are 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
  
differences AR (2). Second, the Hansen test of over-identification confirms the validity of 
the instruments, although appearing to be weaker in the MB regression. The p-values for 
the differences-in-Hansen test of over-identification demonstrate that the instruments in the 
level equations are exogenous. A first main result based on the estimator for family control 
suggests family firms are valued higher than non-family concerns, if we use MB to proxy 
value (see Table 7, column (2)). Therefore, we cautiously accept H1a.  
We obtain our second result from equation [2]. It shows a significant non-linear 
relationship between value and family cash flow rights, meaning we accept H1b and 
irrespective of the choice of firm value indicator (see Table 3, columns (3) and (4)). The 
coefficients on FCO and its quadratic term infer a positive association between increasing 
family corporate ownership and firm value – to approximately 40% to 50% – before 
entrenching at higher levels of control.7 This is an important finding because it implies 
family ownership mitigates agency problems at lower levels of cash flow rights by 
enhancing monitoring efforts and minimizing opportunities for expropriation (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003). Whilst supporting the view that family owners perceive investment as a 
longer-term perspective, which in turn realizes value (James, 1999), it could also imply 
firm owners follow objectives other than value maximization when control is highly 
concentrated. 
While the inverse relationships between CEM and firm value are indicative that 
minority investor’s recognize the separation of ownership and control could allow the 
expropriation of resources by controllers (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the coefficients lack 
significance. This result is partially consistent with findings that show CEM lowers firm 
value in emerging markets (see Lins, 2003). A greater compliance with the Mexican 
Corporate Governance Code (MCCG through BD) realizes higher value inferring that good 
                                                 
 
7 Turning points are found using the second derivative of the coefficients on FCO and its quadratic. 
  
governance practices substitute for weak environments (Poletti-Hughes, 2009). Our result 
supports evidence that family owner’s use compliance to resolve intra-familial disputes 
(Holan and Sanz, 2006). 
 Greater levels of leverage lead to significantly lower levels of firm value 
irrespective of the measure of value. Larger firm size is positively correlated with firm 
value when the Market-to-book ratio is proxy for firm value. Larger firms with better 
corporate governance also generate higher value (column 3). Whilst a capital city location 
produces a value premium, the crisis episode reduced value in 2008 and 2009 (columns 1 
and 3). Whilst firm value diminishes as firms’ age, columns (2) and (4) show a turning 
point exists and that firm value increases again for older firms.   
Table 3 here 
We use quantile regressions to allow for heterogeneous responses to family control 
and governance. Intuitively, low value firms may respond to compliance with governance 
and family control in a way different to higher value firms. This prospect implies more than 
a single parameter is necessary to describe relationships between value and family control, 
and value and governance. Therefore, we use quantile regression to identify the impact of 
our regressors at different points on the distribution of firm value (at the 25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles to represent low, medium and high levels of value). We run Breusch-Pagan / 
Cool-Weisberg tests and reject the null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors, which justifies 
use of quantile regressions. To conserve space, we present results for family control, family 
ownership, CEM and BD, alongside the pseudo R-square for each regression.   
From Table 4, panel A we observe that family ownership creates significantly higher 
firm value for low, medium and high value firms, and irrespective of value measure. This 
finding offers further support for H1 with the modification that family firms are valued 
higher than non-family firms are. Panel B presents the findings for family ownership and 
  
confirms the dominance of family firms, irrespective of the level and measure of value. 
Whereas compliance with best practice corporate governance (BD) is value enhancing for 
firms across the distribution of value (irrespective of proxy), a use of control mechanisms 
(CEM) mostly lessens value for low value firms. Table 4, panel B, offers unconditional 
support for H1b, because the coefficients on FCO and FCO2 indicate the presence of a 
significant and inverse shaped U-relation with firm value with inflexion points between 
about 40% and 50%.   
5.2 Estimated relationships from regressions on risk-taking 
We re-estimate equation [1] using risk as the dependent variable and family to indicate 
family ownership. Drawing on theoretical arguments that firms face different types of risk, 
we estimate separate regressions for performance hazard risk; venturing risk; and total risk. 
We specify orthogonal interaction variables because BD affects risks through interactions 
with covariates. Table 5 shows the results. 
Our main result demonstrates unambiguously that family firms assume significantly 
higher levels of performance hazard risk and venturing risk (at 1 percent) and total risk (at 
5 percent) than non-family firms do (columns 1-3). Based on this result we accept H2a. We 
qualify this important result because there is unequivocal and statistically significant 
evidence that family firms assume different types of risk compared to non-family firms. 
Consistent with our analysis of firm value, we employ system-GMM to re-estimate 
equation [1] and test the robustness of the results. Table 7, columns (3)-(5) offers robust 
statistical evidence that family firms assume greater performance hazard risk (at 1 percent), 
venturing risk (at 5 percent) and total risk (at 10 percent) than non-family firms do. The 
validity of the findings are confirmed by statistical tests (AR(2), Hansen test and diff-
Hansen). Based on the results, we accept H2b and claim that family firms take risks to 
protect patrimony rather than maximise value in Mexico. 
  
We broaden the analysis to include FCO and its quadratic term (Table 5, columns 
(4)-(6)).  Our findings show that family firms assume greater total risk as cash flow 
ownership increases. Entrenchment occurs when the cash flow ownership of the family is 
between 50 and 60 percent (column 6) though the coefficient on the quadratic term in 
insignificant at conventional levels. However, cash flow ownership does not appear to yield 
a significant effect in performance hazard risk or venturing risk (columns 4-5). Our results 
show that venturing risk was significantly higher during the crisis period; whereas total risk 
is decreasing in firm age, a turning point is reached and more mature firms seem willing to 
assume, and manage, higher levels of total risk.  
Table 5 here 
Table 6 reports results from quantile regressions for low-risk and high-risk firms 
only. Panel A (columns (2), (4) and (6) show family firms take greater amounts of 
performance hazard risk, venturing risk, and total risk than high risk (75th percentile) non-
family concerns. We observe a performance differential at low levels of total risk (25th 
percentile). Arguably, families in risky firms prioritise increasing growth and profitability 
by taking larger business projects (Nguyen, 2011). Panel B reveals the presence of an 
inverse U-shape relationship between venturing risk and family control, and total risk and 
family control at low-risk and high-risk family firms.  
 
Table 6 here 
The result that family firms assume greater performance hazard risk supports 
conjecture that preservation of SEW is a salient strategic objective for controlling families 
in Mexico. It suggests families willingly trade the probability of below-par performance in 
the future against the aim of enhancing patrimony through greater risk tolerance, or 
alternatively, to prioritise firm survival over value maximisation. Lastly, our analysis of 
  
risk preferences uncovers significant differences in venturing risks at family and non-
family firms, which might be present for firms that are naturally risk-takers. Our results 
partially support Berrone et al (2012) who find family firms are averse to forward-looking 
venturing risk though tolerant of performance hazard risk providing it preserves SEW.  
A use of control mechanisms offsets a greater total risk-taking of family firms by 
inducing conservatism that significantly lowers total risk-taking and venturing risk-taking 
for high-risk firms. We conjecture that the desire for patrimony could create conservative 
attitudes to risk and surmise this explanation is more credible than the alternative 
proposition that CEM increases the propensity for firm controllers to expropriate.  
The 2010 revision of the MCCG requires firms to identify and report risk factors in 
an effort to improve the transparency of risk management. Board structure should control 
for risk-appetite. Therefore, we employ the cluster regressions and test the null that the 
combined impact of the linear effect of the BD Index plus interaction terms is zero. 
Whereas the findings infer that firms, which more stringently comply with the MCCG 
assume higher total risk and lower performance hazard risk and venturing risk, the results 
are insignificant. Plausibly, shareholders tolerate more risk than firm managers do, because 
shareholders benefit from portfolio diversification and restrictions on downside risk due to 
limited liability. However, family owners could tolerate less risk particularly if they 
associate firm value with family wealth, which owners will not jeopardize in case poor 
decision-making dilutes the inheritance value of the endowed firm (Gómez-Mejía et al, 
2007). Similarly, family owners in Taiwan use familial involvement on boards, and 
cronyism, to control risk-taking to preserve familial wealth (Su and Lee, 2013).  
5.3 Value and risk  
We consider the proposition that causality runs from risk-taking to value. Tables 8a 
and 8b show the results of re-estimating equation [1], omitting the proxies for family, CEM 
  
and BD, and including as covariates the one period lag of risk and firm-specific factors. We 
estimate separate cluster regressions to identify the effect of each risk type on firm value, 
and re-estimate using system-GMM for robustness. Generally, risk-taking realises 
significant value gains. Consistent with our earlier result, the type of risk matters: assuming 
greater performance hazard risk realises higher next period value. Although venturing risk 
yields an effect in the same direction, the coefficient is insignificant. Our evidence suggests 
that Mexican firms embark on riskier strategies to generate greater competitive advantage 
to enhance patrimony. The results are estimated with both measures of value, i.e. TQ and 
MB and confirm that (i) family firms achieve significantly higher corporate values relative 
to non-family concerns; and (ii) risk-taking is a significant predictor of next period value 
and the type of risk matters. 
Table 8a and 8b here 
5.4 Robustness  
To examine the robustness of our results, we specify alternative indicators of 
performance hazard risk. Following Cruz et al (2014), we construct an alternative indicator 
as the natural logarithm of a firm’s ROA (return on assets) at year t-1 to ROA at year t. 
This variable takes a negative value when firm performance at year t is above that of the 
previous year, zero when performance is equivalent, and positive if a firm’s ROA declines, 
which implies that this indicator increases as firm performance declines. Second, we 
employ a performance-adjusted metric, namely, a firm’s ROA median-adjusted by industry 
and year. Lastly, we specify a firm’s annual sales growth median-adjusted by industry and 
year. The choice of sales growth is consistent with Attig et al (2016). The results from re-
  
estimating the value and risk regressions using the alternative indicators of performance 
hazard risk are consistent with the main results.8  
We examine the reliability of our results by determining the predictive validity of the 
models from tests using holdout samples (Woodside, 2013). We randomly divide the 
sample into two sub-samples (firms 1-51 and 52-101). For models reported in column (1) 
and (2) of Table 3, and columns (1, 2 and 3) of Table 5, we estimate the predicted values of 
the dependent variables for firms in sub-sample one using the estimated coefficients from 
the hold-out sample, and repeat the process to derive predicted values for firms in sub-
sample two. To establish the predictive validity of the models we correlate predicted and 
actual values. Table 9 shows all bar one correlation is significant at the 5 percent level 
implying that our models hold predictive validity.  
Table 9 here 
 Conclusions 
The Mexican case offers insight into a Latin American setting on how corporate 
governance can discipline owners and boards when: (1) a weak legal environment struggles 
to protect minority investors; (2) family control is the dominant corporate model; (3) 
cultural traditions promote family patrimony.  
The Mexican context is as an example of an emerging Latin American market. 
Mexico presents an interesting case study for different reasons. First, family ownership is 
the dominant firm ownership model and, in conflict with good corporate governance 
practices, families or family connections tend to both sit on the board and manage the 
company, limiting the involvement of minority shareholders. Culture and traditions in 
Mexico resemble those of the Latin American region where family control is predominant 
as a rational means to safeguard a firm’s resources to pass on to future generations, thereby 
                                                 
8 The results from regressions using the alternative measures of performance hazard risk are available from 
the authors upon request. 
  
increasing a firm’s value as a consequence and possibly increasing the involvement in 
innovative business projects (risk-taking) as a means of achieving that goal. In addition, the 
legal environment in Mexico as in Latin America as a whole, although improved in recent 
years, limits firms’ access to finance as a result of the weak legal system that prevails (La 
Porta et al, 1998).  
Our results strongly suggest the culture and tradition of Mexican families influence 
firm behaviour with repercussions for value and risk-taking. Family controllers desire to 
bequeath viable firms and family descendants participating in firm operations tend to 
demonstrate responsibility and loyalty towards the familial entity. Our findings confirm 
results from other countries showing family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of 
value, particularly in firms with higher values. We also find Mexico’s family firms 
willingly assume higher risk but the objectives for risk-taking differ from those of non-
family firms. Specifically, firms assume performance hazard risk with the aim to preserve 
socioemotional wealth, even though it could increase the probability of financial duress and 
bankruptcy. Firms behave in this manner providing taking this type of risk does not 
endanger continuity of the family firm. By contrast, we find a significant difference 
between the family and non-family cohorts concerning venturing risks, albeit only for firms 
taking greatest risks. This suggests that higher levels of venturing risk might indicate 
greater competitive advantage for family firms, which encourages these firms to pursue 
substitute strategies should firm performance fall below target. 
Importantly, firm value is increasing in cash flow ownership until a threshold of 
control is met, which we calculate to be around 40% to 50%. The Mexican result confirms 
some predictions of agency and stewardship theories: when family control is less 
concentrated, a greater presence of outside and/or affiliate directors lessens agency costs, 
and motivates family members to fulfil organizational objectives in line with the 
  
alignment-of-interests hypothesis. However, our result infers that at higher levels of 
control, the aversion to losing SEW, including the endowment of firms to heirs, instils a 
conservative attitude to risk-taking as firm controllers prioritize objectives other than value 
maximization. Whereas the use of control mechanisms in Mexican firms seem to decrease 
value and risk-taking, this negative effect is offset by the compliance with corporate 
governance recommendations regarding the composition of the board of directors. 
In summary, the Mexican result demonstrates that socioemotional wealth theory can 
adequately explain the dynamics of financial behaviour in family firms. We suggest the 
SEW perspective complements agency and stewardship arguments that are commonly 
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Distribution of observations by category 
 No. of observations % 
Panel A: Controllers 
Sample size 874 100.0 
Widely held 131  15.0  
Family of which: 666 76.2 
Family minority-owned (20-49%) 244  27.9 
Family majority-owned (> 50%) 319  36.5 
Family voting trust 65  9.5 
Non-family (voting trust; foreign; state) 77 8.8 
Panel B: Control mechanisms (CEM) 
No. of firms with at least one CEM 543 62  
Pyramids 156 18  
Multiple control chains 384 44  
Dual-class shares 151 17  
Panel C: Corporate Governance attributes on the composition of boards of directors (BD) 
Non CEO-Chairman duality 539 62  
Board experience 645 74  
Board size (between 5-15 members) 752 86  
Independent directors (=>25%) 838 96  
The control cut-off is at 20%. The sample comprises 874 observations for the period 2004 to 2013. 
 
  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: by Industrial Sector and family versus non-family firms (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 Firms Observations Value Risks 
Industrial Sector No. No. Family firms (% of 667) Tobin’s Q Total Hazard Venturing 
Basic Materials 15 135  81.48  1.38 0.32 -0.11 0.11 
Industrials 29 262  75.95  1.21 0.22 -0.07 0.08 
Consumer Goods 27 210  65.71  1.39 0.24 -0.08 0.06 
Consumer Services  17 135  77.04  1.27 0.19 -0.04 0.08 
Telecommunications 12 93  92.47  1.49 0.26 -0.10 0.08 
Health 4 40  75.00  1.52 0.20 -0.10 0.06 
 [a] All firms [b] Family firms [c] Non-family firms Difference-in-means 
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. [b] – [c] t-statistic 
Tobin’s Q 1.3328 0.6134 1.3457 0.5961 1.2913 0.6659 0.0139 0.30 
Market-to-book 1.7588 1.4365 1.8133 1.4728 1.5837 1.3010 0.2019* 1.85 
Total risk 0.2417 0.2152 0.2530 0.2192 0.2073 0.1989 0.0382** 2.34 
Performance hazard risk  -0.0714 0.2243 -0.0823 0.2274 -0.0369 0.2107 -0.0845*** -3.91 
Venturing risk 0.0813 0.0680 0.0867 0.0751 0.0640 0.0317 0.0219*** 4.36 
BD Index 3.1716 0.7355 3.1982 0.7043 3.0865 0.8237 0.0578 1.03 
Control mechanisms 0.6201 0.4856 0.6877 0.4638 0.4038 0.4919 0.2747*** 7.68 
Size (log) 16.30 1.6921 16.20 1.6236 16.59 1.8696 -0.3843*** -3.00 
Leverage (ratio) 1.0487 2.0671 1.0858 2.1710 0.9286 1.6859 0.1823 1.13 
Dividend paid (ratio) 0.0322 0.0689 0.0290 0.0605 0.0422 0.0904 -0.0140*** -2.64 
Fixed assets (ratio) 0.4215 0.2145 0.4267 0.2154 0.4051 0.2110 0.0274* 1.67 
ADR 0.2323 0.4225 0.1652 0.3716 0.4471 0.4984 -0.2864*** -9.23 
Mexico City 0.5469 0.4981 0.5375 0.4990 0.5769 0.4952 -0.0413 -1.09 
Firm age (years) 30.28 19.42 30.24 18.34 30.38 22.56 0.0257 0.02 
Board size (no.) 11.32 3.69 10.81 3.45 12.96 3.97 -2.1160*** -7.83 
Independents-to-board size 0.4522 0.1457 0.4569 0.1446 0.4372 0.1487 0.0209* 1.88 
The BD Index increases by one unit if a firm complies with any of four good corporate governance practices recommended by the MCCG: (i) Board size - if board size 
ranges from five to fifteen members; (ii) Independence - if the ratio equals at least 20%; (iii) Board experience - if the experience indicator lies between one and three; and 
(iv) CEO-Chairperson non-duality. (See section 3 for further information and definitions of other variables.) 
Table 3 
 
Estimated relationships between firm value and family control/ownership from 
cluster regressions 
 
 (Tobin's Q) (M-B) (Tobin's Q) (M-B) 
Family 0.156 0.430** - - 
 (1.55) (2.12) - - 
FCO - - 0.0887** 0.198** 
 - - (2.18) (2.28) 
FCO2 - - -0.0104** -0.0192** 
 - - (-2.44) (-1.99) 
CEM -0.117 -0.180 -0.123 -0.191 
 (-1.38) (-0.96) (-1.53) (-1.04) 
CG Index 0.146*** 0.284*** 0.108** 0.293*** 
 (2.79) (2.79) (2.52) (2.83) 
Sizet-1 0.0420 0.177*** 0.0447 0.188*** 
 (1.48) (2.82) (1.63) (3.04) 
CG * Sizet-1 - - 0.00437* - 
 - - (1.74) - 
Leveraget-1 -0.0362*** -0.0546** -0.0366*** -0.0560** 
 (-3.78) (-2.45) (-3.60) (-2.35) 
Dividendst-1 0.257*** 0.379** 0.245*** 0.371** 
 (3.33) (1.96) (3.16) (1.98) 
Fixed Assetst-1 - -0.651 - -0.608 
 - (-1.53) - (-1.45) 
CG * Fixed Assetst-1 0.602*** 1.187*** 0.523*** 1.165*** 
 (2.99) (2.74) (2.75) (2.68) 
Mexico City 0.269*** 0.628*** 0.257*** 0.623*** 
 (2.74) (2.90) (2.67) (2.89) 
Crisis -0.136* -0.243 -0.141* -0.251 
 (-1.72) (-1.50) (-1.92) (-1.58) 
Firm age -0.746* -1.961** -0.659 -1.934** 
 (-1.85) (-2.01) (-1.62) (-1.99) 
Firm age2 0.105 0.278* 0.0922 0.273* 
 (1.62) (1.88) (1.40) (1.84) 
Intercept 1.266 1.070 1.276 0.874 
 (1.32) (0.48) (1.37) (0.40) 
Observations 754 756 754 756 
R2 0.277 0.280 0.288 0.282 

















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Quartiles Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
Panel A       
Family 0.146*** 0.224*** 0.146** 0.188* 0.423*** 0.443*** 
 (2.71) (4.18) (2.01) (1.71) (3.53) (3.19) 
CEM -0.135*** -0.0827* -0.000957 -0.190** -0.0542 -0.204 
 (-2.99) (-1.76) (-0.01) (-2.42) (-0.53) (-1.24) 
BD 0.0999*** 0.0822*** 0.175*** 0.185*** 0.226*** 0.270*** 
 (3.14) (2.93) (4.09) (2.74) (3.60) (3.15) 
Pseudo R2 0.1439 0.1830 0.2190 0.1598 0.1981 0.2394 
       
Panel B       
FCO 0.0872*** 0.0893*** 0.0739** 0.158*** 0.226*** 0.235*** 
 (4.05) (4.02) (2.53) (3.33) (4.66) (4.02) 
FCO2 -0.0091*** -0.0089*** -0.0090*** -0.0166*** -0.0239*** -0.0241*** 
 (-3.63) (-3.66) (-2.84) (-2.95) (-4.42) (-3.69) 
CEM -0.121*** -0.0577 0.0217 -0.173** -0.0310 -0.243 
 (-3.19) (-1.37) (0.35) (-2.12) (-0.30) (-1.45) 
BD 0.0854** 0.0709** 0.131** 0.177*** 0.261*** 0.294*** 
 (2.36) (2.22) (2.42) (2.63) (4.02) (3.49) 

























Family -0.057*** 0.0219*** 0.0700** - - - 
 (-2.81) (-2.94) (-2.22) - - - 
FCO - - - -0.00648 0.00667 0.0246** 
 - - - (-0.78) (-1.59) (-2.05) 
FCO2 - - - 0.000171 -0.000493 -0.00206 
 - - - (-0.21) (-0.94) (-1.57) 
CEM 0.0204 -0.0118 -0.0475* 0.0139 -0.0108 -0.0454* 
 (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.70) (-0.86) (-1.17) (-1.68) 
CG Index 0.00234 0.00119 0.0325* 0.00258 0.00133 0.0324* 
 (-0.20) (-0.33) (-1.94) (-0.21) (-0.36) (-1.89) 
Sizet-1 -0.00734 0.000572 0.00947 -0.0107** 0.000828 0.0101 
 (-1.55) (-0.20) (-1.11) (-2.04) (-0.27) (-1.19) 
CG * Sizet-1 -0.0011 - - -0.00125 - - 
 (-1.46) - - (-1.60) - - 
Leveraget-1 0.00563 0.00472 -0.0174*** 0.00508 0.00475 -0.0172*** 
 (-1.41) (-1.43) (-3.30) (-1.31) (-1.43) (-3.20) 
CG * Lev.t-1 0.0203*** - - 0.0207*** - - 
 (-4.08) - - (-4.04) - - 
Dividendst-1 -0.061*** -0.0107* 0.0669** -0.065*** -0.0104 0.0677*** 
 (-3.19) (-1.66) (-2.49) (-3.32) (-1.48) (-2.59) 
Fixed Assetst-1 - -0.0277 - - -0.0259 - 
 - (-1.21) -  (-1.16)  
CG * F. Assetst-1 - - 0.147* - - 0.151* 
 - - (-1.68) - - (-1.75) 
Mexico City - - 0.0853*** - - 0.0853*** 
 - - (-2.99) - - (-2.99) 
ADR - - - 0.0408* - - 
 - - - (-1.72) - - 
Crisis 0.0566 0.0228*** 0.0418 0.0576 0.0225*** 0.0411 
 (-1.14) (-3.00) (-1.42) (-1.14) (-2.94) (-1.41) 
Firm age 0.0185 -0.00848 -0.236** 0.00292 -0.00785 -0.235** 
 (-0.16) (-0.25) (-2.19) (-0.03) (-0.23) (-2.14) 
Firm age2 0.00169 0.00135 0.0322* 0.00448 0.0012 0.0320* 
 (-0.09) (-0.26) (-1.90) (-0.25) (-0.23) (-1.84) 
Intercept -0.0090 0.0652 0.227 0.0428 0.06 0.219 
  (-0.04) (-0.71) (-0.80) (-0.22) (-0.63) (-0.77) 
Observations 758 755 714 758 755 714 
R2 0.065 0.130 0.212 0.065 0.129 0.211 








Estimated relationships of the relationship between risk-taking and family 
control/ownership from quartile regressions for low and high risk firms 
 
Dep. var: Performance hazard risk Venturing risk Total risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Quartiles Q25 Q75 Q25 Q75 Q25 Q75 
Panel A       
Family -0.0217 -0.0275* 0.000647 0.00866** 0.0370*** 0.112*** 
 (-1.19) (-1.79) (1.07) (2.36) (2.95) (3.88) 
CEM 0.00438 -0.00294 -0.000359 -0.00945* -0.0187* -0.062*** 
 (0.30) (-0.22) (-0.57) (-1.93) (-1.67) (-2.74) 
BD 0.00472 -0.00059 0.00083** -0.00147 0.00984 0.0269* 
 (0.37) (-0.03) (2.07) (-0.54) (1.37) (1.85) 
Pseudo R2 0.0646 0.1131 0.1440 0.1624 0.1293 0.1719 
       
Panel B       
FCO 0.00023 0.00085 0.0739** 0.00478** 0.0154*** 0.0355*** 
 (0.28) (0.92) (2.53) (2.44) (2.81) (2.66) 
FCO2 -0.00199 0.0194 -0.009*** -0.0005** -0.0013** -0.0031** 
 (-0.10) (0.99) (-2.84) (-2.23) (-2.07) (-2.01) 
CEM 0.00455 -0.00363 -0.000143 -0.0098** -0.0151 -0.0469** 
 (0.34) (-0.27) (-0.47) (-2.02) (-1.40) (-2.01) 
BD 0.00201 0.00381 0.000026 -0.0017 0.0059 0.0284* 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.72) (-0.59) (0.73) (1.91) 



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Family 0.0437 0.313* 0.126* -0.0955*** 0.0323** 
 (0.96) (1.81) (1.92) (-2.81) (2.04) 
CEM -0.0544 -0.139 -0.0172 0.135** 0.00324 
 (-1.19) (-0.91) (-0.34) (2.17) (0.14) 
BD -0.00509 -0.291 -0.00601 -0.0158 -0.00955 
 (-0.12) (-1.44) (-0.17) (-0.54) (-1.01) 
Size t-1  0.0169 0.126 -0.0134 -0.0602*** -0.00389 
 (0.52) (1.34) (-0.51) (-3.69) (-0.85) 
Leverage t-1 -0.0243** -0.0689** -0.0183** 0.00882 0.00163 
 (-2.21) (-2.15) (-2.00) (0.98) (0.83) 
Div. ratio t-1 0.378 1.316 0.425 -0.154 -0.0181 
 (0.63) (0.53) (1.44) (-0.56) (-0.29) 
Fixed assets t-1 0.119 -0.394 0.114 0.0389 -0.0505 
 (0.51) (-0.54) (0.91) (0.23) (-1.66) 
ADR  0.00183  0.0755  0.00704 
 (0.03)  (1.04)  (0.54) 
DF 0.105*** 0.308**    
 (2.63) (2.29)    
Dependent 
variables-1 
0.709*** 0.631*** 0.533*** -0.0577 0.602*** 
 (8.57) (6.37) (3.88) (-0.85) (9.04) 
Intercept 0.139 -0.388 0.237 1.021*** 0.100 
 (0.27) (-0.22) (0.66) (3.41) (1.06) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013 
AR(2) 0.536 0.628 0.039 0.639 0.477 
Hansen test 0.262 0.145 0.390 0.329 0.276 
Diff-Hansen 0.225 0.106 0.411 0.885 0.595 
Observations 765 767 725 770 763 








Estimated relationships between firm value and lagged risk from cluster regressions 
 
 (TQ) (TQ) (TQ) (MB) (MB) (MB) 
P. haz risk -0.231* - - -0.982*** - - 
 (-1.91) - - (-3.88) - - 
Vent. riskt-1 - 0.0742 - - 1.947 - 
 - (0.18) - - (1.11) - 
Total riskt-1 - - 1.568*** - - 2.636*** 
 - - (7.71) - - (6.44) 
Sizet-1 0.0229 0.0230 0.00388 0.143** 0.149** 0.118* 
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.15) (2.27) (2.33) (1.94) 
Leveraget-1 -0.0404*** -0.0419*** -0.00197 -0.0621** -0.0719*** 0.00963 
 (-3.34) (-3.43) (-0.24) (-2.47) (-3.08) (0.33) 
Dividendst-1 0.244*** 0.260*** 0.157** 0.330* 0.431** 0.201 
 (3.00) (3.16) (2.55) (1.74) (2.34) (1.15) 
Fixed Assetst-1 -0.156 -0.134 -0.0140 -0.789* -0.644 -0.508 
 (-0.68) (-0.58) (-0.09) (-1.73) (-1.43) (-1.25) 
Mexico City 0.294** 0.287** 0.213*** 0.693*** 0.677*** 0.517*** 
 (2.51) (2.42) (3.05) (3.05) (2.92) (3.05) 
ADR -0.0559 -0.0603 -0.0646 -0.149 -0.206 -0.186 
 (-0.47) (-0.50) (-0.79) (-0.55) (-0.77) (-0.80) 
Crisis -0.122 -0.137* -0.216*** -0.186 -0.252 -0.373** 
 (-1.42) (-1.77) (-2.69) (-0.95) (-1.58) (-2.21) 
Firm age -0.772** -0.939** -0.557* -1.975** -2.431** -1.840* 
 (-2.05) (-2.52) (-1.86) (-2.17) (-2.36) (-1.96) 
Firm age2 0.117* 0.140** 0.0919* 0.295** 0.357** 0.287** 
 (1.91) (2.32) (1.91) (2.15) (2.30) (1.98) 
Intercept 2.118** 2.417*** 1.736*** 2.627 3.241 2.316 
 (2.30) (2.62) (2.69) (1.40) (1.52) (1.27) 
Observations 754 750 713 756 751 715 
R2 0.223 0.221 0.461 0.257 0.248 0.349 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.205 0.449 0.242 0.233 0.335 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 









Estimated relationships between firm value and lagged risk from system GMM 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 TQ TQ TQ MB MB MB 
Total risk t-1 1.478***   3.079***   
 (4.89)   (4.29)   
Per. hazard t-1  -0.258**   -0.777***  
  (-2.45)   (-2.77)  
Vent. risk t-1   0.689   2.181 
   (1.12)   (1.01) 
Size t-1  -0.00539 0.130*** 0.147** 0.0462 0.348** 0.407*** 
 (-0.09) (2.80) (2.49) (0.26) (2.50) (3.01) 
Leverage t-1 -0.0364** -0.0541*** -0.0503*** -0.0846 -0.137*** -0.136*** 
 (-2.00) (-6.13) (-3.18) (-1.46) (-6.11) (-3.61) 
Div. ratio t-1 1.402 -0.223 3.372 -1.347 -2.790 0.117 
 (1.30) (-0.20) (1.50) (-0.39) (-0.73) (0.02) 
ADR 0.00410 -0.152 -0.261 0.0301 -0.304 -0.383 
 (0.03) (-1.04) (-1.59) (0.06) (-0.68) (-0.79) 
Mexico City 0.171* 0.279*** 0.201* 0.613** 0.916*** 0.858** 
 (1.94) (2.81) (1.85) (2.01) (3.41) (2.48) 
Intercept 1.158 -0.737 -1.091 0.412 -3.834* -5.063** 
 (1.24) (-0.98) (-1.15) (0.14) (-1.75) (-2.32) 
AR(2) 0.276 0.587 0.324 0.539 0.112 0.187 
Hansen test 0.142 0.390 0.132 0.357 0.475 0.463 
Diff-Hansen 0.520 0.778 0.145 0.746 0.213 0.658 
Observations 728 765 761 730 767 762 
Instruments 71 98 71 71 98 71 
No. of groups 99 103 103 99 103 103 
 
t statistics in parentheses 







Correlation of actual values and predicted using hold-out samples 
 





P1, Actual 0.2476* 0.3191* 0.1223* 0.2156* 0.3328* 
P2, Actual 0.1940* 0.2473* 0.0798 0.2093* 0.2883* 
 
Note: P1 is the predicted value for sub-sample 1 using hold-out sample 2. P2 is the predicted value for sub-
sample 2 using hold-out sample 1. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
